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 COMMENT 
The New Blame Game: 
How Airbnb Has Been Mis-regulated 




Airbnb allows anyone with a spare couch to make extra money by rent-
ing it out to others. Since 2008, more than 3 million listings world-wide 
have been booked through Airbnb. Many view Airbnb as a cheaper alter-
native to staying in a hotel, and thus, the incumbent hotel industry views 
Airbnb as a threat. Because the American hotel industry is valued at more 
than $1.1 trillion, hotel lobbyists convinced law makers to create regula-
tions that makes it illegal to use Airbnb in some cities. Cities who have 
passed “anti-Airbnb” laws — like New York City and San Francisco — 
explain the regulation is to help fix their affordable housing shortages. 
However, New York City has struggled to offer affordable housing for 
the last 100 years, and San Francisco has struggled for the last 30. Thus, 
Airbnb’s status as a scapegoat for problems it did not create has led poli-
cymakers to mis-regulate it. 
Mis-regulation occurs when regulation does not fix the problem it was 
enacted to solve. This article first looks at what sort of issues regulation 
is capable of fixing. After that, a regulatory framework is provided that 
urges policymakers to only enact regulation that provides the greatest net 
benefit for all involved. In the case of Airbnb, two-way reputational 
mechanisms — the ability to rate the other party, usually through a pub-
lic “five-star” rating system — has solved most of the problems regula-
tion is capable of curing. Then, the article analyzes the current anti-
Airbnb laws in New York City and San Francisco, and argues they are 
not providing a greater net benefit for anyone but the incumbent hotel in-
dustry. In conclusion, policymakers should not pass any new anti-Airbnb 
regulation until it can create a greater net benefit than what exists now. 
 
                                                          
* Kenyon Briggs is a J.D. candidate at the University of Missouri – Columbia School of Law, May 
2019. Dual B.A. from Graceland University in Lamoni, IA, 2016. The author would like to thank his 
editors and advisors, Benjamin Kweskin and Professor Randy Diamond, his girlfriend Tanner King, 
Professor Thomas Lambert for writing an incredibly helpful book. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
The year is 2008 and you live in a big city. One day, a stranger approaches 
you and offers money to spend the night in your spare bedroom. You decline. 
Why? Because you know nothing about this person, and the risk of inviting them 
into your home far outweighs the financial gain. Most people would call this a 
reasonable decision. If the roles were reversed, and you were in need of a place to 
stay, would you offer money to a stranger to spend the night in their home? Un-
likely; you would rather stay in a hotel. Why? Because as a reasonable person, 
you would rather pay more for the security that comes from staying in a hotel 
room than gamble the risks associated with a cheap room in a stranger’s home. 
 Now the year is 2017, and thousands of people choose to stay in 
strangers’ homes every day. What changed? Did travelers decide to throw caution 
to the wind? No, Airbnb happened. The home sharing company now operates in 
over 65,000 cities across 191 countries throughout the world.1 The San Francisco 
start-up, turned industry disruptor, has facilitated over 3 million property listings 
which have “hosted” more than 200 million guests since its founding in 2008.2 By 
harnessing the power of mobile phone apps, Airbnb helped pioneer the “sharing 
economy.”3 The concept of the sharing economy is simple: pair people who have 
underutilized assets lying around with people who are willing to pay for those 
assets.4 Assets that would have remained underutilized in 2008, like spare bed-
rooms and open vehicle seats, can now generate money for their owners thanks to 
sharing economy companies like Airbnb and Uber.5 The sharing economy is a 
“marvelous thing.”6 
However, not everyone supports Airbnb. The incumbent hotel industry is 
leading a charge against Airbnb’s unprecedented displacement of traditional lodg-
ing establishments.7 Hotels, bed and breakfasts, and inns have operated in a world 
without Airbnb for thousands of years.8 But today, with the American hotel indus-
try valued at $1.1 trillion,9 there is no warm embrace for a company that can house 
guests for less.10 It is then no surprise that the hotel industry has spent millions of 
                                                          
 1. About Us, AIRBNB, https://www.Airbnb.com/about/about-us (last visited Sept. 9, 2017). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Adam Thierer, Christopher Koopman, Anne Hobson & Chris Kuiper, How the Internet, the 
Sharing Economy, and Reputational Feedback Mechanisms Solve the “Lemons Problem”, MERCATUS 
CTR. 34 (May  2015), https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Thierer-Lemons-Problem.pdf (one defini-
tion of the sharing economy). 
 4. Id. 
 5. About Us, supra note 1; The Uber Story, UBER,  https://www.uber.com/our-story/ (last visited on 
Sept. 9, 2017). 
 6. THOMAS A. LAMBERT, HOW TO REGULATE: A GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS 215 (2017). 
 7. Ahmed Mahmoud, The Impact of Airbnb on Hotel and Hospitality Industry, HOSPITALITYNET 
(Mar. 7, 2016), https://www.hospitalitynet.org/opinion/4074708.html. 
 8. Luke 2:7 (“She wrapped Him in swaddling clothes and laid Him in a manger, because there was 
no room for them in the inn.”). 
 9. Katie Benner, Inside the Hotel Industry’s Plan to Combat Airbnb, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/16/technology/inside-the-hotel-industrys-plan-to-combat-
airbnb.html. 
 10. Alison Griswold, You can rent an entire home on Airbnb for the price of a hotel room in the US, 
QUARTZ (Sept. 16, 2016), 
https://qz.com/779121/Airbnb-vs-hotel-cost-comparison-you-can-rent-an-entire-home-on-Airbnb-for-
the-price-of-a-hotel-room/ (citing a study put out by an anti-Airbnb lobbying group, Share Better, 
showing the daily going rates for an entire home on Airbnb vs a hotel room in four big cities. Airbnb 
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dollars lobbying policymakers across the country to slow down Airbnb’s growth.11 
One anti-Airbnb group, the New York City Hotel Association, Inc., commissioned 
a report that showed 480,000 nights were reserved in New York City hotels from 
September 2014 to August 2015, compared to 2.8 million nights spent in New 
York City Airbnb homes, resulting in a direct loss of approximately $450 million 
for the hotel industry.12 This rapid increase in competition caused an additional 
$108 million loss from less traffic in hotel restaurants and bars.13 The turf battle 
between The New York City Hotel Association and Airbnb shows no signs of 
slowing down.14 New York City is not an outlier; hotel industries across the Unit-
ed States are feeling the same Airbnb impact.15 Hotel lobbyists are now calling on 
policymakers to “level the playing field” by blaming Airbnb for causing local 
problems like New York City’s affordable housing shortage.16 
As a result, anti-Airbnb regulation has swept America’s biggest cities, forcing 
Airbnb to be regulated like national hotel chains.17 Chicago18 and San Francisco19 
now require Airbnb hosts to obtain business licenses from their respective city 
                                                          
vs Hotels in: New York – $200 vs $260; Los Angeles – $155 vs $165; San Francisco – $200 vs $275; 
Miami – $175 vs $195). 
 11. Benner, supra note 9 (In early 2016, the New York Times obtained two documents authored by 
the American Hotel and Lodging Association, which described a “multipronged, national campaign 
approach at the local, state and federal level” that would lobby politicians and state attorney generals to 
“reduce the number of Airbnb hosts, funding studies to show Airbnb is filled with people who are 
quietly running hotels out of residential buildings and highlighting how Airbnb hosts do not collect 
hotel taxes and are not subject to the same safety and security regulations that hotel operators must 
follow.”). 
 12. Mahmoud, supra note 7. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Jordan Crook, The battle between hotels and Airbnb escalates in NYC, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 7, 
2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/08/07/the-battle-between-hotels-and-Airbnb-escalates-in-nyc/; 
Share Better, Airbnb: Who’s In Your Building?, YOUTUBE (July 31, 2017), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=30&v=gMVpXZGgJDc (The New York City Hotel 
Association launched an attack ad in July 2017 calling Airbnb a threat to security because the Man-
chester Bomber used a short-term lease for his base of operation.). 
 15. From Air Mattresses to Unregulated Business: An Analysis of the Other Side of Airbnb, AM. 
HOTEL & LODGING ASS’N, 
https://www.ahla.com/sites/default/files/Airbnb_Analysis_September_2016_0.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 
2018) (The American Hotel and Lodging Association (“the AHLA”) issued a report in January 2016 
that tracked Airbnb activity in 14 cities across the country. The AHLA estimated what each city could 
have earned in taxes if Airbnb had to pay the same city and state lodging taxes that hotels pay. The 
notable lodging tax obligations that could have been generated include: Phoenix, $5.3 million; Los 
Angeles, $41.1 million; Miami, $15.9 million; San Francisco, $30.3 million.). 
 16. Barry Bridges, Airbnb Seen as Creating Uneven Playing Field, NEWPORT THIS WEEK (Feb. 9, 
2017), http://www.newportthisweek.com/news/2017-02-
9/Front_Page/Airbnb_Seen_as_Creating_Uneven_Playing_Field.html. 
 17. Arjun Kharpal, Airbnb’s growth is slowing because it’s being hit by regulation, UBS says, 
CNBC (Apr. 13, 2017, 7:33 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/04/13/Airbnb-growth-slowing-
regulation-ubs.html. 
 18. Shared Housing and Accommodations Licensing, CITY OF CHI., 
https://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/bacp/supp_info/sharedhousingandaccomodationslicensing
.html (last visited on Sept. 10, 2017); Shared Housing Host/Shared Housing Unit, CITY OF CHI., 
https://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/bacp/supp_info/sharedhousinghost.html (last visited Sept. 
10, 2017). 
 19. Elizabeth Weise, Airbnb rentals in San Fancisco may dive with new host rules, USA TODAY 
(May 1, 2017, 6:01 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2017/05/01/Airbnb-san-
francisco-settlement-regulations-illegal-homeaway/101168688/; Bay City News, Airbnb launches new 
registration system, S.F. EXAMINER (Sept. 6, 2007, 4:17 PM), http://www.sfexaminer.com/Airbnb-
launches-new-registration-system/. 
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before hosting Airbnb guests. It is almost entirely illegal to use Airbnb in New 
York City after Governor Andrew Cuomo passed new regulations in 2016 that 
impose a $7,500 fine on people for simply advertising their apartments on 
Airbnb.20 Cities like Chicago21 and Miami22 have zoning ordinances preventing 
Airbnb from operating in select areas. Chicago also allows property owners to 
place their buildings on a “prohibited housing list” which stops their tenants from 
hosting on Airbnb.23 
The emergence of the sharing economy has given legal scholars a limitless 
number of topics to explore for years to come. Some have tried to bring clarity to 
the term “sharing economy.”24 Others argue that there should be more regulation 
to combat the “horror stories” emerging from sharing economy businesses like 
theft, discrimination, and sexual assault.25 On the other hand, some argue Airbnb 
does not need regulation because the sharing economy has already solved the 
problems legislatures are capable of fixing.26 A few critique the prolific arguments 
against regulating the sharing economy.27 Some discuss the constitutionality of 
existing regulations.28 And several have proposed different ways to regulate the 
sharing economy.29 
                                                          
 20. Katie Benner, Airbnb Sues Over New Law Regulating New York Rentals, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/22/technology/new-york-passes-law-airbnb.html; Jillian  
Jorgensen, Trump Tower apartment owner among first two hit with Airbnb ad fines, N.Y. DAILY NEWS 
(May 7, 2017, 9:08 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/manhattan/nyc-apartment-owner-hit-
Airbnb-ad-fines-article-1.3146056. 
 21. See e.g., Airbnb Help Center: Chicago, Il, AIRBNB, 
https://www.Airbnb.com/help/article/861/chicago--il (last visited Sept. 10, 2017). 
 22. Lora Kolodny, These homeowners faced an Airbnb nightmare as renters left them facing huge 
fines and angry neighbors, CNBC (Sept. 1, 2017, 10:41 AM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/01/Airbnb-nightmare-homeowners-fined-after-renters-illegal-
listings.html (the city of Miami imposes a $20,000 fee if a property listed on Airbnb is in a certain part 
of the city, and tenants caused their landlord to be hit with that fee). 
 23. Tanveer Ali, Here Are The Buildings Where Airbnb Is Banned In Chicago, DNA INFO (Jan. 13, 
2017, 5:57 AM), https://www.dnainfo.com/chicago/20170113/loop/airbnb-home-share-banned-
michele-smith-shared-housing-ordinance/. 
 24. Inara Scott & Elizabeth Brown, Redefining and Regulating the New Sharing Economy, 19 U. PA. 
J. BUS. L. 553, 562–66 (2017) (Defending the name “sharing economy” even though the name under-
mines how large the market is. The authors provide several examples of how large and multi-faceted 
the sharing economy is in an attempt to help others see the complexities that come with trying to regu-
late businesses under the sharing economy umbrella.). 
 25. Diana Cao, Regulation Through Deregulation: Sharing Economy Companies Gaining Legitima-
cy by Circumventing Traditional Frameworks, 68 HASTINGS L. J. 1085, 1086–87 (2017) (“The current 
regulatory framework fails to address whether the new companies are subject to the same rules as the 
traditional companies, a different set of rules, or no rules at all. At the same time, major companies of 
the sharing economy take advantage and openly flout regulations that others in essentially the same 
industry are subject to.”). 
 26. Thierer, Koopman, Hobson & Kuiper, supra note 3, at 16, 44–45 (Explaining how traditional 
regulation requires governmental oversight and high costs of compliance which increase the cost for 
consumers while also creating barriers to entry for new market participants. Instead, this article shows 
how fewer regulation and more reliance on two-way “reputational mechanisms” is the most effective 
way to level the informational playing field because it solves the same issues traditional regulations do, 
but much easier and more naturally.). 
 27. See, e.g., Abbey Stemlar, Feedback Loop Failure: Implications for the Self-Regulation of the 
Sharing Economy, 18 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 673 (2017) (explaining how “reputational mechanisms” 
are often viewed as an alternative to regulating the sharing economy, but this article argues the psy-
chology behind reputational mechanisms has flaws, and that reputational mechanisms do not work as 
well as some think they do). 
 28. Cory Scanlon, Re-Zoning the Sharing Economy: Municipal Authority to Regulate Short-Term 
Rental of Real Property, 70 SMU L. REV. 563, 572 (2017) (exploring case law from Texas courts 
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This article argues that current regulations wrongfully target Airbnb and do 
nothing to fix the underlying problems. Both New York City and San Francisco 
say they are in the middle of a housing crisis and these anti-Airbnb regulations 
were created to fix that crisis.30 But Airbnb neither caused the century-old housing 
crisis, nor is it exacerbating the shortage now. Airbnb has been mis-regulated. 
This article pulls the curtain back: the incumbent hotel industry spent millions of 
dollars to “capture” policymakers in an effort to create regulatory red tape meant 
to eliminate Airbnb as a competitor. Finally, a solution on how to more effectively 
regulate Airbnb is proposed. The “physician’s approach,” which will be explored 
more deeply, is a framework that policymakers should use when determining how 
to regulate the sharing economy. It encourages regulation that cures the underly-
ing problem, and thus prevents mis-regulation. 
Regulation is everywhere in America.31 Because regulations have fixed prob-
lems in the past,32 more regulation seems like the answer in addressing problems 
critics say Airbnb is causing now. Regulating the sharing economy will be a chal-
lenge for policymakers in the future. There may be appropriate times for regulat-
ing Airbnb, but the point is Airbnb should not be mis-regulated. Policymakers 
“mis-regulate” when they create regulation that does not fix a stated problem.33 
Mis-regulation should be avoided because policymakers should “maximize social 
welfare,” not hold back innovation.34 Mis-regulation — in the form of anti-Airbnb 
regulation —has resulted from the artificial link between Airbnb and the growing 
affordable housing crisis in San Francisco and New York City.35 While affordable 
housing is an issue, the legitimacy of the link to Airbnb’s growth is suspect and 
will be challenged. 
Part II of this article explains why regulation has targeted businesses in the 
past: to update the buyer on necessary information about the seller’s goods or 
services so they could make an educated decision. However, Airbnb’s two-way 
“reputational mechanisms” have effectively cured the information imbalance in 
                                                          
where plaintiffs have challenged the regulations placed on short-term renters as “illegally interfering 
with their due process, assembly, and privacy rights”, and arguing some of the zoning laws may actual-
ly violate parts of the Texas constitution). 
 29. Bryan Wilson, Smarter Cities, Smarter Regulations: A Case for the Algorithmic Regulation of 
Platform-Based Sharing Economy Firms, 85 UMKC L. REV. 845, 849, 860 (2017) (The author argues 
that regulating Airbnb and Uber like their hotel and taxi counterparts is not the right approach because 
they are not as analogous as some think. Instead, the author calls for algorithms to monitor the sharing 
economy companies and to continually identify new issues so that information can quickly be given to 
policymakers to make informed regulatory decisions with.). 
 30. See infra Part III. 
 31. LAMBERT, supra note 6, at 1 (explaining that even though “[r]egulation is a hot topic of conver-
sation,” it is not either all good or all bad. They are a mix of both.). 
 32. Alex Tabarrok & Tyler Cowen, The End of Asymmetric Information?, CATO UNBOUND (Apr. 6, 
2015), https://www.cato-unbound.org/issues/april-2015/end-asymmetric-information (For example, 
when the odometer first came out, car owners would wind the miles down before trying to sell the 
vehicle. In response the Federal Odometer Act was passed making odometer tampering a federal 
felony. Other common examples include federally established minimum drinking ages, driving speed 
limits, local zoning ordinances, and maximum interest rates.). 
 33. LAMBERT, supra note 6, at 1. 
 34. Id. at 250. 
 35. Emma Hinchliffe, No Vacancy – How Airbnb’s New York City problem is just getting worse, 
MASHABLE (Apr. 3, 2017), http://mashable.com/2017/04/03/Airbnb-nyc-no-
vacancy/#8G9XhequAPq6; Carolyn Said, Most Airbnb hosts flout SF laws, city report says, SFGATE 
(Apr. 7, 2016, 9:21 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Airbnb-hosts-flout-SF-laws-city-
report-says-7235343.php. 
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Airbnb transactions, and thus, the current regulatory scheme qualifies as mis-
regulation. Part II then identifies different types of regulations and assesses the 
pros and cons of using each one. Finally, part II identifies the types of problems 
Airbnb has been linked to and lays out a regulatory metaphor — the “physician’s 
approach.” This framework will be used throughout the rest of this article to show 
how Airbnb is mis-regulated because the greatest net benefit is not being 
achieved. 
Part III dives deep into existing anti-Airbnb regulations in New York City 
and San Francisco to show how — while they sandbag Airbnb to benefit the hotel 
industry — they do not solve the stated problems linked to Airbnb. This is mis-
regulation. Part IV offers best regulatory practices for the future. Finally, this 
article argues that because Airbnb’s two-way reputational mechanisms already 
provide a net benefit, policymakers should not enact new regulation until it can 
provide a greater net benefit than the status quo offers. The goal is to help balance 
interests and prescribe a solution that encourages innovation while promoting 
safety. 
II.  WHY AND HOW TO REGULATE AIRBNB 
The hotel industry wants policymakers to force Airbnb hosts to follow the 
same regulations as national hotel corporations.36 To understand why “regulating 
up” on Airbnb is misguided, it is helpful to know how regulation works. 
A.  Why Regulate, “The Market for ‘Lemons’” and Information 
Asymmetry 
The traditional economic market is the place to start when answering the 
question “why regulate?”37 George Akerlof won the Nobel Prize in economics for 
his paper titled, “The Market for Lemons,” which analyzes the market for used 
cars.38 Akerlof explains how “information asymmetry” — disproportionate bar-
gaining power between two parties — is a major issue economic markets experi-
ence.39 When information asymmetry exists, one party is at an informational dis-
advantage, and if imbalance persists, the result is “adverse selection.”40 The mar-
                                                          
 36. Bridges, supra note 16. 
 37. See LAMBERT, supra note 6, at 1 (“the two groups most involved in crating the substance of 
regulation – lawyers and economists . . . .”). 
 38. See George Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mecha-
nism, 84 Q. J. ECON 488, 489–90 (1970). 
 39. Id. (information asymmetry is when, in an arms-length transaction, one party has more infor-
mation than the other). 
 40. Thierer, Koopman, Hobson & Kuiper, supra note 3, at 7–8 (“Akerlof argues that when sellers 
have more information about products than the potential buyers [information asymmetry], as for ex-
ample, in a used car market, then the lower quality cars (lemons) would crowd out those of higher 
quality because uncertainty among buyers would depress the average value of used cars. The lemons 
problem suggests that used cars tend to command a lower market price because potential buyers are 
unable to tell whether a used car is good or bad. As a consequence, sellers of higher-valued cars exit 
the market, and only lemons are offered. The market may eventually collapse because of this ongoing 
adverse selection process. Akerlof, describing the information problems inherent with purchasing a car 
in the 1970s, concluded, ‘[i]t is impossible for a buyer to tell the difference between a good car and a 
bad car . . . or even obtain the expected value of a new car.’ Therefore, sellers have to accept low 
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ket for used cars is teeming with information asymmetry because most buyers 
have no way of knowing whether the seller is offering a high quality vehicle or a 
“lemon.”41 Allowing information asymmetry to persist leads to all parties being 
worse off.42 
When information asymmetry persists, markets are inefficient and fail.43 
Thus, correcting market failures is the “standard theory” behind regulation.44 In an 
attempt to correct market failures throughout history, policymakers have used 
information asymmetry as the “chief justification for consumer protection regula-
tions” to put both parties in equal bargaining positions.45 Regulation has helped 
cure the problem of information asymmetry for centuries.46 
B. “How to Regulate: A Guide for Policymakers” 
The “physician’s approach” is a framework for how to most efficiently regu-
late the sharing economy. Presented in his book “How To Regulate: A Guide for 
Policymakers,” Thomas Lambert tasks policymakers to “gather as much . . . in-
formation as can be cost-effectively gathered on all potential regulatory options, 
and then select the option that minimizes the sum of error and decision costs.”47 
Lambert’s approach suggests that policymakers behave like a physician treat-
ing a patient.48 First, a physician identifies the patient’s physical symptoms.49 
Symptoms are the adverse effects caused by what is wrong inside of the patient 
and are often why the patient originally decided to visit.50 Second, the physician 
diagnoses the cause of the symptoms; the disease.51 After identifying the disease, 
the physician should consider all available remedies capable of addressing it.52 
Finally, the physician assesses the net benefits of each remedy, and considers each 
one’s expected benefit, difficulty of carrying out, and potential side effects.53 In 
                                                          
prices for higher-quality cars because buyers have trouble distinguishing between low and high-quality 
secondhand vehicles.”). 
 41. Akerlof, supra note 38 (the buyer can look at the car and make certain surface level judgment 
calls, but has no real way of knowing). 
 42. Thierer, Koopman, Hobson & Kuiper, supra note 3, at 7–8. 
 43. Joshua D. Wright, The Antitrust/Consumer Protection Paradox: Two Policies at War with Each 
Other, 121 YALE L. J.2216, 2218 (2012) (A market failure is when “markets fail to realize full gains 
from trade through efficient production.”). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Thierer, Koopman, Hobson & Kuiper, supra note 3, at 4. 
 46. See Wright, supra note 43, at 2222 (“For example, consider the cases of exploding toasters and 
toys tainted with dangerous levels of lead. In either case, standard economic models of market failure 
associated with informational asymmetries may justify regulation to correct market failure. Current 
regulations to combat monopolies, information asymmetries, and externalities draw upon this standard 
economic model.”). 
 47. LAMBERT, supra note 6, at 14. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. (cough, headache, difficulty breathing, pain, etc.). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. (the flu, common cold, cancer, etc.). 
 52. Id. at 14–15 (This range of possible remedies includes everything from remedies that will fully 
cure the root of the symptoms, and remedies that will only alleviate the symptoms temporarily without 
actually fixing the source. Examples of possible remedies include a band aid, medicine, or surgery.). 
 53. Id. at 15 (One remedy may be ideal at curing the disease, but it also may be expensive. Others 
may be cheaper, but will only prolong the inevitable operation that needs to happen.). 
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the end, the physician should prescribe the remedy that offers the “greatest net 
benefit.”54 
Similarly, policymakers are called on to enact regulation after adverse symp-
toms are spotted.55 Airbnb was created in 2008,56 and several symptoms have 
since been linked to Airbnb’s presence. Some of these symptoms include shrink-
ing affordable housing, failing to pay local taxes, and property owners losing 
money.57 Like a physician, policymakers should track symptoms down to the 
causal disease, and, after weighing all possible remedies, select the one that pro-
vides the greatest net benefit for the market. Enacting any remedy should cure 
both the disease and the symptoms. Alternatively, only treating the symptoms 
allows the disease to go unchecked, which only causes more symptoms to arise 
later. Treating the symptom only is mis-regulation.58 
C.  Why Parties are Calling for Airbnb to be Regulated 
To prescribe the regulation that provides the greatest net benefit, a policy-
maker must identify the underlying disease that is causing the symptoms. But, 
while the disease may be difficult to see, symptoms are easily visible. There are 
many symptoms in the market today, but Airbnb is not the causal disease in most 
cases. 
i.  Affordable Housing Options  
New York City and San Francisco are two examples of cities with limited af-
fordable housing options for their millions of residents.59 While a lack of afforda-
ble housing is not a new problem in these cities, the incumbent hotel industry 
claims that Airbnb’s recent presence is worsening the housing crisis.60 The hotel 
                                                          
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. About Us, supra note 1. 
 57. See infra Part II.C. 
 58. LAMBERT, supra note 6, at 1. 
 59. Kathleen Elkins, How much it costs to rent a 1-bedroom in 30 major cities around the world, 
CNBC (Mar. 26, 2017, 10:00 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/24/how-much-it-costs-to-rent-a-1-
bedroom-in-30-cities-around-the-world.html (While average-rent studies often vary, one recent study 
shows New York City and San Francisco are the two most expensive places to live in the world, based 
off average one-bedroom rental rates: New York - $3,680 per month; San Francisco - $3,360 per 
month.); Matt Weinberger, This is why San Francisco’s insane housing market has hit the crisis point, 
BUS. INSIDER (July 8, 2017 10:00 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/san-francisco-housing-crisis-
history-2017-7 (“San Francisco is the second-densest city in the US after New York City, with more 
than 870,000 people packed into about 47 square miles, giving you about 18,580 people per square 
mile.”). 
 60. Andrew J. Hawkins, Airbnb is now banned from listing short term rentals in New York, VERGE 
(Oct. 21, 2016, 3:16 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2016/10/21/13361536/Airbnb-new-york-cuomo-
bill-ban-short-term (“Airbnb has been accused of exacerbating New York’s housing crisis by housing 
advocates, the state’s powerful hotel union, and members of the state legislature and New York City 
Council.”); Hinchliffe, supra note 35 (“The company became a scapegoat for a long-brewing housing 
crisis, in [New York City] where average rent increased by 40 percent over 20 years while wages only 
increased by 15 percent.”); Carolyn Said, The Airbnb effect, S.F. CHRON. (July 12, 2015), 
http://www.sfchronicle.com/Airbnb-impact-san-francisco-2015/ (“Most of the booming vacation-rental 
company’s local listings are only occasionally rented to travelers, as Airbnb says. However, at least 
350 entire properties listed on Airbnb . . .  appear to be full-time vacation rentals, bolstering claims by 
activists that the services remove scarce housing from the city’s limited inventory.”). 
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industry argues someone in San Francisco or New York City who is unable to 
afford rent should move and free up their unit for someone else.61 But by using 
Airbnb to make extra money, that person continues to occupy the unit, leading to 
fewer available housing options for everyone else.62 The symptom visible to legis-
latures and renters is a lack of housing options. 
However, while Airbnb may keep some housing options from turning over,63 
Airbnb is not the disease. There are many larger reasons why affordable housing 
has been disappearing over the past several decades. For example, the amount of 
rent-stabilized apartments in New York City has rapidly decreased over the last 
ten years.64 In addition, property owners have quelled desirable housing options.65 
In San Francisco, the city council made several anti-development zoning decisions 
between the 1950’s and 1990’s.66 The side effects of those early decisions are 
what haunt San Francisco today.67 Airbnb grew directly out of the housing crisis 
in San Francisco, and to say that Airbnb made the situation worse is illogical.68 
The hotel industry turned Airbnb into a scapegoat and lobbied policymakers to 
regulate it to reduce competition.69 
ii.  Increased Tourism 
Local residents claim the increase in Airbnb tourism disrupts their peaceful 
neighborhoods. In Nashville, tourists are staying in neighborhoods surrounding 
the city, and locals claim the noise and party scene is “fraying . . . their communi-
                                                          
 61. Said, supra note 60. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Said, supra note 35 (“Airbnb and its ilk stir controversy because of concerns that lucrative vaca-
tion rentals siphon off badly needed housing . . . Both sides of the debate say they want to help middle-
income people. Most San Francisco hosts are middle-class people who rent to travelers 48 days a year 
for supplemental income that helps them afford spiraling costs, Airbnb said. ‘Airbnb and short-term 
rentals did not create the housing crisis, but they are definitely exacerbating it . . . [w]hen you have 
housing that could go to middle-income or working-class people but is taken off the market . . . .’”). 
 64. Amy Plitt, Behind New York City’s affordable housing crisis, CURBED N.Y. (Aug. 1, 2017), 
https://ny.curbed.com/2017/8/1/16073616/new-york-city-affordable-housing-crisis (“[S]ince 2007, at 
least 172,000 apartments have been deregulated. To give an example of how quickly affordable hous-
ing can vanish, between 2007 and 2014, 25 percent of the rent-stabilized apartments on the Upper 
West Side of Manhattan were deregulated.”). 
 65. Id. (“A woman I know . . . was recently presented with a new lease in which the rent went from 
$1,017 to $2,109 per month. The hike was perfectly legal.” The hike by her landlord came after the 
woman had lived in the apartment for 23 years. Another example of shady landlords involves a land-
lord who “paid a homeless man to sleep outside [the tenant’s] door, defecate in the hallway, invite 
friends in for drug-fueled parties, and taunt [the tenant] as she entered and left the building.”). 
 66. Weinberger, supra note 59 (This article identifies how several anti-development zoning deci-
sions San Francisco made decades ago are coming back to haunt them: (1) San Francisco adopted 
zoning regulations designed to preserve “the city’s character and local color – at the expense of new 
housing development” shortly after the “Fillmore project” of the 1950’s. (2) San Francisco banned 
buildings over 40 feet tall in most parts of the city, as well as residential areas. (3) San Francisco’s 
laws allow neighborhoods to object to new housing developments, which has blocked new construc-
tion. Finally, a San Francisco Weekly article written in 1999 expressed appreciation for the restrictive 
zoning regulations because “[t]hey’ve helped preserve San Francisco’s character and encouraged the 
community to become more engaged in local politics.”). 
 67. Id. 
 68. LAMBERT, supra note 6, at 215 (“Airbnb . . . thrive[s] precisely because of information asym-
metry.”) 
 69. Hinchliffe, supra note 35 (“The company became a scapegoat for a long-brewing housing crisis . 
. .”). 
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ty.”70 European cities are facing similar problems.71 Venice, a city of 54,500 resi-
dents, receives 30 million tourists a year, “pushing the city to an environmental 
tipping point and undermining quality of life for its citizens.”72 Other European 
cities fear becoming “a theme park for tourists.”73 The symptom is more tourism in 
previously quiet areas and an increase in noise and partying. But, the disease is 
disruptive people, not Airbnb. The problem in Venice was growing long before 
Airbnb came to town, and cruise ship companies continue to unload thousands of 
tourists a day in Venice.74 While extra noise in quiet Nashville neighborhoods is 
undesirable, there are already regulations designed to stop this problem.75 Noise 
ordinances are in place for this reason, and if a neighbor’s party is too loud, resi-
dents can call the police. Regulation targeting Airbnb in cities like Nashville only 
address one of the symptoms created by disruptive people — an additional set of 
regulations will not provide greater net benefits. 
iii.  Failing to Pay Proper Taxes 
Many demand that Airbnb make hosts pay local hotel taxes.76 Several cities 
and states claim that Airbnb hosts are effectively running businesses, and as such, 
should be subject to the same business taxes as hotels.77 The symptom is two-fold: 
(1) A fairness argument is being made — because other businesses must pay hotel 
taxes, Airbnb should too;78 and (2) the government misses out on additional reve-
nue. The disease is different depending on the city. For example, in San Francis-
co, Airbnb hosts are required by law to register their property with the city, pro-
                                                          
 70. Victor Luckerson, Not in My Neighbor’s Backyard: Airbnb has taken over Nashville, and the 
city is reaching its boiling point, RINGER (Nov. 21, 2017), 
https://www.theringer.com/features/2017/11/21/16678002/Airbnb-nashville. 
 71. Tom Slee, Airbnb is Facing an Existential Expansion Problem, HARV. BUS. REV. (July 11, 
2016), https://hbr.org/2016/07/Airbnb-is-facing-an-existential-expansion-problem (Colleagues at New 
University of Lisbon are “very much concerned with what is rapidly happening to the historical center 
of [their] beautiful city. Our estimate is that in the last three years, around one-quarter or even one-
third of the housing stock has changed function, mainly toward financial investments and short rent-
als.”). 
 72. Cecilia Rodriguez, Blacklisting Venice To Save It From Too Many Tourists And Too Few Vene-
tians, FORBES (May 29, 2017, 6:48 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ceciliarodriguez/2017/05/29/blacklisting-venice-to-save-it-from-too-
many-tourists-and-too-few-venetians/#1fc22ffc1e50 (Venice “worries about the gigantic cruise ships, 
mass tourism and the irreversible damage they’re wreaking on the fragile lagoon ecosystem are not 
new. . . . Already the World Monument Fund placed Venice on its watch list . . . .”). 
 73. Slee, supra note 71. 
 74. Rodriguez, supra note 72. 
 75. NASHVILLE, TENN , CITY NOISE ORDINANCE 11.12.070 (1993). 
 76. Carolyn Said, SF wants Airbnb hosts to pay taxes on beds, stoves and cutlery, SFGATE (Mar. 
17, 2016), http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/San-Francisco-wants-Airbnb-hosts-to-pay-taxes-on-
6906551.php. 
 77. From Air Mattresses to Unregulated Business: An Analysis of the Other Side of Airbnb, supra 
note 15. 
 78. Elena Toledo, Acapulco Hotel Owners Unite Against With New Tax Bill Countering “Unfair” 
Competition, PANAMPOST (July 13, 2017, 11:24 AM), https://panampost.com/elena-
toledo/2017/07/13/hotel-owners-unite-against-Airbnb/ (A 3% tax will soon be charged on Airbnb hosts 
in Acapulco, Mexico to level the playing field. Jorge Laurel Gonzalez, president of the Association of 
Hotels and Tourism Companies said Airbnb’s ability to offer “full houses at lower prices than formal 
hotels should be considered ‘unfair competition’” because “it inhibits the growth and interest of corpo-
rations and hotel chains.”) (emphasis added). 
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vide proof of liability insurance, pay proper taxes, and obey municipal codes.79 
Thus, the symptom only arises when the San Francisco host fails to register with 
the city. In other states, there is no law requiring registration, but Airbnb hosts 
must still pay taxes.80 Hotel taxes are required to be paid by those who fit the defi-
nition of a hotel. While outside of the scope of this article, the debate about 
whether or not Airbnb should be classified as a business will largely impact 
whether all Airbnb hosts need to pay taxes.81 
iv.   Criminal Behavior 
Airbnb has been in the news repeatedly for bad guest behavior and criminal 
activity occurring in its listings. Also, Airbnb has been accused of promoting rent-
al discrimination.82  Additionally, other “horror stories” include guests breaking 
into locked areas of host’s homes, leaving messes, using and selling drugs, and 
using the property as a temporary brothel.83 Further, there are accounts of sexual 
assault against guests by Airbnb hosts.84 While these symptoms are terrible, the 
disease is not Airbnb. These same crimes occur in large, regulated hotel chains. 
For example, a male guest at the Hilton Hotel and Resort in Waikiki, Hawaii was 
the victim of a hate crime after being raped and permanently injured by a guest 
who was a member of the British Royal Military.85 The disease is bad people. As 
                                                          
 79. Airbnb, Inc. v. City & Cty. of S.F., 217 F. Supp. 3d 1066, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (preliminary 
injunction requested by Airbnb, arguing San Francisco’s ordinance is unconstitutional, denied). 
 80. In what areas is occupancy tax collection and remittance by Airbnb available?, AIRBNB, 
https://www.Airbnb.com/help/article/653/in-what-areas-is-occupancy-tax-collection-and-remittance-
by-Airbnb-available (last visited Oct. 22, 2017) (a list of what states require Airbnb hosts to pay taxes). 
 81. Keep Chi. Livable v. City of Chi., No. 16 C 10371, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35231, at *8, n.11 
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2017) (in opposing Chicago’s new Shared Housing Ordinance requiring Airbnb 
hosts to register with the city, obtain licenses, meet “location restriction standards,” maintain records, 
follow sanitation requirements, and pay business taxes, the organization, Keep Chicago Livable, argues 
they should not have to follow these requirements because they are not hosting guests as part of a 
“business activity.” Instead, Keep Chicago Livable claims, “[t]he primary purpose for many hosts on 
platforms such as Airbnb is not necessarily to obtain a profit. Hosts enjoy sharing their homes with 
guests for many reasons that have nothing to do with making a profit, such as making new friends, 
learning about different cultures, showing off one’s home and city to a newcomer or simply out of 
empathy for a traveler who could not otherwise afford to stay in a downtown hotel.” The court ruled in 
favor of the city.). 
 82. See, e.g., Selden v. Airbnb, Inc., No. 16-CV-00933 (CRC), 2016 WL 6476934, at *1 (D.D.C. 
Nov. 1, 2016) (African American man sued Airbnb after alleging race-based discrimination. Man was 
told a host’s property was no longer available after requesting room with profile picture showing he 
was African American, but same host was “only too happy to rent the residence” when same plaintiff 
made request under pseudonym with photo of white male.); Amy B. Wang, ‘One word says it all. 
Asian’: Airbnb host banned after allegedly canceling guest because of her race, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 7, 
2017, 7:40 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-Airbnb-discrimination-20170407-
story.html. 
 83. See, e.g., Harry Bradford, Most Airbnb Rentals Go Perfectly. Then There Are These Horror 
Stories, HUFFINGTON POST (July 29, 2014, 12:04 PM), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/29/Airbnb-horror-stories_n_5614452.html. 
 84. Shivani Vora, Airbnb Sued by Guest Who Says a Host Sexually Assaulted Her, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/02/travel/Airbnb-lawsuit-host-sexual-assault.html 
(A guest was sexually assaulted by her Airbnb host. The host had achieved “superhost” status, and 
Airbnb’s annual host and guest background check did not catch that the host had been previously 
arrested and charged with battery, which should have prevented him from being a host.). 
 85. Juergen T. Steinmetz, Man on man rape at the Hilton Hawaiian Village: Washed under the 
carpet by Honolulu Police?, ETURBONEWS (Sept. 25, 2016), https://eturbonews.com/147775/man-
man-rape-hilton-hawaiian-village-washed-under-carpet-honolul. 
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said above, there are already laws created to disincentivize criminal behavior. If a 
crime is committed in a regulated hotel, the hotel calls the police. Additional anti-
Airbnb regulation will not create a greater net benefit for people, nor will it stop 
bad people from stealing, discriminating, and hurting others. 
v.  Tenant Profiteering 
Property owners say they are losing money because of Airbnb.86 For example, 
a hypothetical tenant could agree to pay her landlord $1,000 per month, but then 
charge an Airbnb guest $150 per night. Although this tenant would make more 
money than she paid in rent, the disease is a lack of affordable housing options. 
And as said above, regulating Airbnb will not halt the rising housing prices and 
shrinking affordable options.87 If a property owner is unhappy with their tenants 
“unfairly” profiteering, the property owner can make short-term leasing illegal via 
contract. 
However, one problem that can be fixed with Airbnb regulation is Airbnb 
hosts charging exorbitant nightly rates while living in a rent-stabilized apartment. 
In Goldstein v. Lipetz, an elderly tenant living in a rent-stabilized apartment with 
rent capped at $1,758 per month was charging guests between $95-$120 per 
night.88 The New York Rent Stabilization Code says tenants in rent-stabilized 
apartments could only charge 110% of their per diem rate, which was $63.58.89 
By charging approximately $30 more per night than the legal limit, the court af-
firmed summary judgment terminating the tenant’s lease, and the tenant was 
evicted.90 In these limited situations — given the highly coveted and quickly 
evaporating rent-stabilized apartments — the problem is exacerbated by Airbnb. 
Because regulation like the New York Rent Stabilization Code can remedy the 
disease, it should prevent these tenants from substantial profiteering through 
Airbnb listings. 
D.  How to Cure the Disease: Potential Remedies, Side Effects, 
and Reputational Mechanisms 
Four government-created remedies capable of curing disease in economic 
markets are listed below, along with the unique characteristics, advantages, and 
disadvantages of those remedies. In addition, two non-government created reme-
dies are introduced that can render traditional regulations obsolete: voluntary dis-
                                                          
 86. See, e.g., Dara Kerr, NYC judge said to order Airbnb host to stop ‘profiteering’ off rental, CNET 
(Dec. 24, 2014), https://www.cnet.com/news/nyc-judge-orders-woman-to-stop-profiteering-off-airbnb-
rental/ (“Penraat was sued by her landlord . . . . The 62-year-old woman is reportedly legally entitled 
not to pay rent increases each year because she is a senior . . . . Her rent is said to be fixed at roughly 
$4,200 per month, while she was allegedly making an average of $6,500 per month on her Airbnb 
rentals . . . .”). 
 87. Jonathan Miller, Tracking New York Rents and Asking Prices Over a Century, N.Y. CURBED 
(June 2, 2015), https://ny.curbed.com/2015/6/2/9954250/tracking-new-york-rents-and-asking-prices-
over-a-century (showing how the average rent in New York City has rapidly increased over the past 
century). 
 88. Goldstein v. Lipetz, 150 A.D.3d 562, 563–64 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017). 
 89. Id. at 564. 
 90. Id. at 572. 
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closures and reputational mechanisms. There is no perfect remedy.91 However, if 
new regulation does not create a greater net benefit than the status quo already 
offers, the best remedy for policymakers is to do nothing.92 
i.  Command and Control 
The most basic form of regulation occurs when the government says what an 
actor cannot do and establishes a punishment for what happens if the rule is bro-
ken.93 Command and control assumes the government knows what is best, and 
that it is in a position to effectively decide what the standards should be.94 The 
main benefit to this approach is it reduces targeted activity by inducing the actor 
to monitor their own behavior.95 However, there are side effects. The key side 
effect is how easily policymakers are “captured” by lobbyists of interested par-
ties.96 Command regulation also requires a large resource commitment from the 
issuing group to draft and enforce the regulation.97 Finally, command regulation 
creates high performance standards for smaller market participants, further disin-
centivizing new parties from entering the market.98 
Command and control regulations are the primary type of regulation created 
to combat Airbnb right now.99 Command and control regulation is not capable of 
fixing most of the symptoms addressed above. Because Airbnb is an online, peer-
to-peer business model, policymakers struggle to track transactions and enforce 
laws against Airbnb hosts.100 
ii.  Taxes 
Taxing as a form of regulation requires the actor to pay more when they act 
more.101 The advantages of tax regulations are they do not lead to the large barri-
ers of entry that command and control regulations do; taxing is less capable of  
manipulation by lobbyists, and they are unlikely to lead to powerful disincen-
tives.102 Taxing Airbnb hosts per night may help alleviate the symptoms of having 
an unfair advantage and lost tax revenue, however, just like command and control 
regulations, taxing requires significant administrative oversight.103 The burden is 
                                                          
 91. LAMBERT, supra note 6, at 250. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 30 (examples of this include the Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act which place business-
es under “emission limitations,” and force each organization falling under these acts to regulate them-
selves). 
 94. Id. at 31. 
 95. Id. at 30–31. 
 96. Id. at 32–33 (a perfect example of capturing is happening in New York City right now). 
 97. Id. at 33. 
 98. Id. 32. 
 99. See, e.g., Sasha Lekash, Detroit slips into Airbnb ban and everyone, even the mayor, is really 
confused, MASHABLE (Feb. 8, 2018), https://mashable.com/2018/02/08/airbnb-detroit-
ban/#YISyJx2Xqqqm (an example of cities largely banning home-sharing platforms). 
 100. Ameena Walker, New York’s anti-Airbnb law is proving tough to quickly enforce, NY CURBED 
(May 11, 2017), https://ny.curbed.com/2017/5/11/15626876/new-york-anti-Airbnb-law-enforcement-
issues (three months after New York City’s anti-Airbnb laws were enacted, the 32-person enforcement 
team only caught .05% of illegal listings). 
 101. LAMBERT, supra note 6, at 36. 
 102. Id. at 39. 
 103. Id. at 42. 
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placed on the host to self-monitor their behavior. Several cities require Airbnb 
hosts to pay taxes,104 and these cities struggle to enforce this rule.105 
iii.  Licensure 
Licenses are required by certain professionals and are intended to ensure a 
minimum level of quality.106 The official stated reason for “licensure regimes” is 
to cure adverse selection by preventing “lemons” from entering the market and 
only allow licensed professionals who possess a high level of expertise to contract 
with consumers.107 Licenses prevent adverse selection by banning low quality 
services but do not remedy the disease of information asymmetry in economic 
markets.108 License regulations can be manipulated by lobbyists and often create 
an unnecessary barrier to entry.109 
Chicago has begun a licensure regime for some Airbnb hosts.110 While the 
city is attempting to ensure certain quality, sanitation, and safety standards, the 
problem remains that many Airbnb hosts ignore license requirement and choose to 
operate illegally.111 Just like command regulations and taxes, license regulations 
are difficult to enforce in the peer-to-peer arena of Airbnb. 
iv.  Mandatory Disclosure 
Mandatory disclosures can cure information asymmetry when the government 
requires one party to disclose information to the other so both parties can make an 
informed decision.112 The most common example is disclosing ingredients on food 
labels. Other examples include requiring a prospectus when issuing stock, and 
stating the APR charged by credit card companies. By requiring the seller to bring 
the purchaser up to speed, both high and low quality goods stay on the market, 
because the purchaser is able to choose who to contract with.113 The difficulty 
with government mandatory disclosure, as with command and control and taxes, 
is that it assumes the government knows what information will bring the other 
party up to speed.114 Government mandated disclosure is not yet a popular regula-
tion for Airbnb. However, Airbnb practices its own form of mandatory disclosure 
                                                          
 104. In what areas is occupancy tax collection and remittance by Airbnb available?, supra note 80. 
 105. See infra Part III. 
 106. LAMBERT, supra note 6, at 194. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 195 (In Nashville, the local government requires all “shampoo technicians” – people who 
shampoo hair in salons – to first complete 300 hours of education in the area of “practice and theory” 
of shampooing. Critics argue someone does not need 300 hours to learn how to shampoo hair. Another 
argument against licensure regimes is that licenses try to ensure all service providers are the equivalent 
of a fully loaded Cadillac- high quality. But “[n]ot everyone needs or wants a fully loaded Cadillac all 
the time; sometimes a Chevy will do.”). 
 110. Shared Housing and Accommodations Licensing, supra note 18 (the Chicago Shared Housing 
Ordinance establishes a number of standards short-term rental hosts must follow, specifically that 
“Shared Housing Units” do not need to receive a license, but “Vacation Rentals” do need a license). 
 111. Ally Marotti, Airbnb hosts still not registered 4 months after Chicago’s new rules took effect, 
CHIC. TRIB. (Aug. 2, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-chicago-Airbnb-rules-
enforcement-0803-biz-20170802-story.html. 
 112. LAMBERT, supra note 6, at 197. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 197–98. 
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by requiring all users to upload a clear photograph of themselves, photographs of 
the living space, their full name, and accurate contact information.115 
v.  Voluntary Disclosure 
The need for mandatory disclosure goes away when market participants prac-
tice “voluntary disclosure.”116 Voluntary disclosure is the reason George Akerlof’s 
“Market for ‘Lemons’” is flawed.117 The market for used cars is flourishing be-
cause of voluntary disclosure, and “sellers of good used cars have discovered 
credible ways to signal the quality of their offerings.”118 Examples of voluntary 
disclosures include advertising, quality associated with brand recognition and 
reputation, third-party quality certificates, inspection periods, free trials, and mon-
ey-back-guarantees.119 Voluntary disclosure is currently used by Airbnb partici-
pants. Hosts must compete with one another, and this competition provides an 
incentive to voluntarily disclose the quality of the property to potential guests. 
Some hosts even hire professional photographers to showcase the property, and 
Airbnb helps facilitate this.120 
vi.  Reputational Mechanisms 
A reputational mechanism is an extremely efficient, non-governmental reme-
dy that leads parties to monitor their own behavior to appear trustworthy. “Repu-
tation — or the fear of its loss — can act as a powerful incentive to both constrain 
opportunistic behavior and incentivize honest transactions among individuals 
within the market.”121 Economist Gordon Tullock explains the power of reputa-
tional mechanisms in the following way: 
A reputation for being “sound” is a valuable asset, and we should expect 
people to make every effort to get it . . . . When the market is broad and 
there are many alternatives, you had better cooperate. If you choose the 
noncooperative solution, you may find you have no one to noncooperate 
with.122 
Reputational mechanisms began as one-way rating systems, but the growth of 
the internet allows sharing economy companies to use reputational mechanisms 
between both buyer and seller.123 Two-way rating is simple: after each stay, the 
                                                          
 115. What are the requirements to book on Airbnb?, AIRBNB, 
https://www.Airbnb.com/help/article/1170/what-are-the-requirements-to-book-on-Airbnb (last visited 
Nov. 25, 2017),. 
 116. LAMBERT, supra note 6, at 201. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Get a professional photographer for your listing, AIRBNB, 
https://www.Airbnb.com/professional_photography (last visited Nov. 24, 2017). 
 121. Thierer, Koopman, Hobson & Kuiper, supra note 3, at 17. 
 122. Gordon Tullock, Adam Smith and the Prisoners’ Dilemma, 100 Q. J. ECON. 1073, 1081 (1985). 
 123. Thierer, Koopman, Hobson & Kuiper, supra note 3, 25–27 (When the internet became wide-
spread, Consumer Reports began compiling their reviews online as well as in print. Over the next 
couple of years, Amazon and Yelp reinvented the usefulness of product reviews. These reviews “per-
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host rates the guest, and vice versa. Both parties leave public and private feedback 
for the other.124 Guests can leave “star ratings” for their hosts on a scale of one to 
five for “overall experience, cleanliness, accuracy, value, communication, check-
in, and location,” and these star ratings are shown publicly for future guests to 
see.125 
Some may find the two-way reputational mechanism ineffective. But think 
about a hypothetical purchase on eBay: if there are two sellers of the same product 
(say a pair of Rainbow sandals), and one has a five star average rating (with over 
1,000 customer reviews) while the other has a three star rating (with two customer 
reviews), who will you buy from? eBay was the first company to heavily rely on a 
two-way rating system, allowing total strangers to confidently transact with each 
other across the world.126 When both parties know they will be rated publicly after 
each transaction, it is in their best interest to tell the truth.127 Reputational mecha-
nisms are cheap, effective, and require no administrative oversight.128 Reputation-
al mechanisms also reward good behavior, like subsidies, and punish bad behav-
ior, like taxes.129 
A peer-to-peer reputational mechanism is the best remedy for Airbnb. As said 
above, policymakers acting like physicians should seek to maximize social wel-
fare by prescribing the remedy that (1) addresses the underlying disease, and (2) 
provides the greatest net benefit for people.130 In the case of Airbnb, peer-to-peer 
reputational mechanisms provide the greatest net benefit. Airbnb’s two-way rating 
system is the reason why strangers now pay money to stay in other stranger’s 
homes.131 Airbnb’s reputational mechanism has cured information asymmetry — 
the main historical reason132 for implementing regulation — as effectively as any 
above-mentioned remedy can.133 The next part will show how no existing anti-
Airbnb regulation in New York City or San Francisco is curing the underlying 
disease and is only aimed at slowing Airbnb’s growth. 
                                                          
form the vital function of providing consumers with the information they need before they engage in 
an exchange.”). 
 124. Hosts and guests reviews, AIRBNB, https://www.Airbnb.com/help/article/2059/host-and-guest-
reviews (last visited Apr. 16, 2018). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Thierer, Koopman, Hobson & Kuiper, supra note 3, at 26. 
 127. Id. at 17 (“Reputational constraints, like religious or ethical constraints, prevent individuals from 
lying and 
cheating by making such behavior very costly in the market”). 
 128. Id. at 42. 
 129. Id. at 19. 
 130. LAMBERT, supra note 6, at 14. 
 131. Thierer, Koopman, Hobson & Kuiper, supra note 3, at 33 (“While some may point out that these 
mechanisms do not directly increase the trust between the transacting parties, the end result is the 
same: Transactions that would not otherwise occur due to lack of trust are indeed facilitated. This is 
similar to the way personal referrals have worked in the traditional economy. Some people may not at 
first trust Bob the plumber to repair a sink, but if all their coworkers recommend him, then they may 
indeed choose to hire him.”). 
 132. Id. at 4. 
 133. Id. (“Importantly, reputational incentives and reputational feedback mechanisms have also 
increasingly helped market actors overcome information symmetries.”). 
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III.  WHAT REGULATIONS ARE CURRENTLY IN EFFECT, AND HOW 
EFFECTIVELY ARE THEY FIXING THE PROBLEMS? 
The policymakers in New York City and San Francisco have not behaved like 
physicians, and have instead been captured by the hotel industry. So far, this arti-
cle has identified the present symptoms, exposed the diseases causing these symp-
toms, laid out several government and non-government remedies, and weighed the 
pros and cons of each. This article now turns to present anti-Airbnb regulations in 
New York City and San Francisco. This article argues that both cities have mis-
regulated Airbnb because both identify a lack of affordable housing as the prob-
lem, but neither set of regulations fix that problem. 
A.  New York City 
Governor Cuomo has made it almost entirely illegal to host an Airbnb.134 
First, it is illegal to rent out a “class A” multiple dwelling for fewer than 30 
days.135 Class A multiple dwellings include tenements, flat houses, and apart-
ments; New York City’s Multiple Dwelling Law explains that class A multiple 
dwellings “shall only be used for permanent residence purposes.”136 Actions that 
are considered “inconsistent” with the Multiple Dwelling Law include the follow-
ing: 
occupying a dwelling unit for fewer than thirty consecutive days by other 
. . . persons . . . as house guests or lawful boarders, roomers or lodgers; or 
incidental and occasional occupancy of such dwelling unit for fewer than 
thirty consecutive days by other natural persons when the permanent oc-
cupants are temporarily absent . . . .137 
The terms “[b]oarders, roomers or lodgers” have been interpreted to only ap-
ply to guests in an unoccupied home.138 So if an Airbnb host were “temporarily 
absent” while a guest was present, the host would run afoul of this rule.139 Violat-
ing the Multiple Dwelling Law is a misdemeanor that can be punished with either 
a $500 fine, up to 30-days of imprisonment, or both.140 Repeat offenders may be 
punished with a $1,000 fine, up to six months of imprisonment, or both.141 It is 
also illegal to advertise a class A multiple dwelling rental for fewer than 30 
                                                          
 134. Joshua Brustein, N.Y. Governor Cuomo Signs Bill to Fine Illegal Airbnb Hosts, BLOOMBERG 
(Oct. 21, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-21/n-y-governor-cuomo-signs-
bill-to-fine-illegal-Airbnb-hosts (Governor Cuomo signed the Multiple Dwelling Law, which would go 
into effect in January, 2017). 
 135. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 4(7)–(8) (McKinney 2011). 
 136. Id. § 4(8). 
 137. Id. 
 138. New York, NY, AIRBNB, https://www.Airbnb.com/help/article/868/new-york--ny (last visited 
Oct. 30, 2017). 
 139. Id. 
 140. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 304(1) (McKinney 1984). 
 141. Id. 
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days.142 The penalty for simply advertising is a $1,000 fine for the first violation, 
$5,000 for the second, and $7,500 for every violation thereafter.143 
If an Airbnb host manages to avoid the first two regulations by sharing the 
space and not advertising, the host will violate a third law. A host is not allowed to 
operate a “hotel.”144 There are two defined types of hotels: apartment hotels and 
transient hotels. An apartment hotel is defined as hosting a guest in a class A mul-
tiple dwelling with at least three dwelling or rooming units that provides any of 
the following to its guests: “housekeeping, telephone, desk, or bellhop service, or 
the furnishing of laundering of linens.”145 A transient hotel does not have the class 
A multiple dwelling requirement and is defined as hosting a guest in any building 
where a guest may rent sleeping or living accommodations on a daily basis.146 
Between the two definitions of hotel, every host in New York City is barred from 
hosting an Airbnb guest. 
Future Airbnb hosts in New York City also need to be cautious of specific 
laws applied to rent-stabilized and rent-controlled properties. Rent-stabilized 
properties are governed by Chapter 4 of the New York City Administrative Code, 
and rent controlled properties are governed by Chapter 3.147 There are specific 
amounts that tenants in these rent-capped properties can charge Airbnb guests as 
discussed above.148 
Finally, Airbnb hosts are required to pay hotel taxes in New York City.149 
New York tax law requires operators of “apartment hotels” and “bed and breakfast 
establishments” to collect sales tax on the rental charge.150 In New York City spe-
cifically, hotels must charge an additional $1.50 “hotel unit fee” per unit, per day, 
in addition to state and local sales taxes.151 To avoid the hotel taxes in New York 
City, a guest would have to qualify as a “permanent resident” which is defined as 
a guest who stays 90 consecutive days without interruption.152 To avoid the New 
York City local sales tax, the guest must stay 180 consecutive days.153 
The New York Multiple Dwelling Law is a textbook example of command 
and control regulation.154 And true to the nature of command regulation, the Mul-
tiple Dwelling Law has been difficult to enforce against Airbnb’s peer-to-peer 
transactions. After about three months of its enactment, New York City officials 
only issued fines to 139 listings.155 However, during that time there were over 
                                                          
 142. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 121(1) (McKinney 2016) (It shall be unlawful to advertise occupan-
cy or use of dwelling units in a class A multiple dwelling for occupancy that would violate subdivision 
eight . . . of this chapter defining a “class A” multiple dwelling.). 
 143. Id. § 121(2). 
 144. Zoning Resolution, CITY N.Y. (Mar. 30, 2018), 
http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/planning/download/pdf/zoning/zoning-text/art01c02.pdf?r=0927. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. (To qualify as a transient hotel, the building must also have at least one common entrance, 
provide 24 hour desk service, and provide one of the following: housekeeping, telephone, bellhop 
service, or furnishing or laundering of linens service.) 
 147. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 26-401–415, 26-501–520 (2017). 
 148. See supra Part II(C)(e). 
 149. Hotel and Motel Occupancy, N.Y. ST. DEP’T TAX’N & FIN. 1 (May 9, 2012), 
https://www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/tg_bulletins/sales/b12_331s.pdf. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 2. 
 153. Id. 
 154. See supra Part II(D)(a). 
 155. Walker, supra note 100. 
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23,000 listings in New York City that were potentially illegal, meaning that the 
command and control regulation only caught .05% of rule breakers.156 As a result, 
Mayor Bill de Blasio has already allocated $1.6 million of taxpayer money, and 
agreed to $2.9 million over the next two years, in an effort to add 16 more inspec-
tors to the 32-member team who will search for illegal Airbnb listings.157 
This anti-Airbnb regulation is expensive, requires a large team to enforce, and 
has been ineffective at catching violators. This is a perfect example of mis-
regulation that does not provide the greatest net benefit for the city. The New 
York City legislature explicitly stated the problem it is trying to fix is a lack of 
affordable housing, “[t]he council hereby finds . . . that there continues to exist an 
acute shortage of dwellings which creates a special hardship to person and fami-
lies occupying rental housing . . . .”158 But how is Governor Cuomo, by making 
Airbnb illegal, doing anything to bring back the affordable housing options that 
have been disappearing in New York City? Only time will tell. Until then, it ap-
pears that the Multiple Dwelling Law’s only purpose is to slow Airbnb’s growth, 
not cure the underlying disease.159 
B.  San Francisco 
San Francisco encourages its residents to understand what laws must be fol-
lowed to legally host an Airbnb listing. San Francisco provides a series of infor-
mational documents, and a five-step approach to legal hosting.160 
“Step 1: Check for Eligibility.”161 The city’s website explains that hosts must 
meet the following requirements: be permanent residents of San Francisco, own or 
be the tenant of the property, live in the dwelling for at least 60 days, and plan to 
live in the unit for a minimum of 275 nights per year.162 In addition, the “dwell-
ing” must also meet certain conditions: it must comply with all city codes,163 can-
not be a “Single-Room-Occupancy” or “dormitory,” cannot be a “Below-Market-
Rate” or “Public Housing” unit, must have the proper permit,164 and must register 
with the city.165 
“Step 2: Understand the Rules.”166 In addition to these basic requirements, 
San Francisco requires every host to have at least $500,000 of property liability 
insurance.167 Airbnb provides this liability insurance for its customers.168 Finally, 
                                                          
 156. Id. (explaining that at this rate, it will take the Mayor’s Office of Special Enforcement over 43 
years to get to all the illegal listings). 
 157. Rosa Goldensohn, De Blasio ramps up Airbnb enforcement, CRAIN’S N.Y. (Apr. 26, 2017), 
http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20170426/REAL_ESTATE/170429915/mayor-bill-de-blasio-
budgets-1-6-million-to-crack-down-on-Airbnb#. 
 158. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-501 (2017) (emphasis added). 
 159. See supra Part II(C)(a). 
 160. Short-Term Residential Rental, S.F. Bus. Portal (June 27, 2017), 
https://businessportal.sfgov.org/start/starter-kits/short-term-rental. 
 161. Id. 
 162. S.F. ADMIN. CODE §§ 41A.4,  41A.5(g)(1)(A) (2017). 
 163. Id. § 41A.5(g)(1)(H). 
 164. Short-Term Residential Rental, supra note 161 (definition of “short-term residential rental”). 
 165. S.F. ADMIN. CODE § 41A.4 (2017) (definition of “short-term residential rental registry”). 
 166. Short-Term Residential Rental, supra note 161. 
 167. S.F. ADMIN. CODE § 41A.5(g)(1)(D) (2017). 
 168. Id. 
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if a property is located in a rent-controlled unit, monthly revenue from Airbnb 
hosting cannot exceed the host’s monthly rent.169 
“Step 3: Register with the Treasurer and Tax Collector.”170 The city makes it 
clear that operating an Airbnb listing is a business, so each host must obtain a 
Business Registration Number.171 With that number, hosts are required to register 
with the city Treasurer and Tax Collector.172 
“Step 4: Apply with the Office of Short-Term Rentals.”173 With the Business 
Registration Number, hosts are required to pay a $250 application fee.174 If the 
host satisfies all the requirements, they will receive a business license and certifi-
cate.175 
“Step 5: Stay Compliant.”176 Once a licensed business, San Francisco requires 
their hosts to do five things: (1) report short-term rental stays every quarter with 
the Office of Short-Term Rentals;177 (2) renew the business certificate annually 
with the Treasurer and Tax Collector; (3) pay the Transient Occupancy Tax, 
which is 14% of the revenue earned on any stay fewer than 30 days;178 (4) file and 
pay personal property taxes for the business; and (5) renew the certificate with the 
Office of Short-Term Rentals every two years.179 
San Francisco tries to help its residents navigate this regulatory mine field, so 
they can legally use Airbnb. These command and control regulations — registra-
tion with the city, quarterly reporting, paying taxes, and annual rental caps — all 
depend on the host voluntarily registering.180 As of August 2017, after two years 
of being in effect, the registration requirements led to only one quarter of hosts 
voluntarily registering with the city.181 This evidence supports the idea that com-
mand and control is an ineffective remedy for the sharing economy. Licenses are 
designed to ensure minimum levels of quality, but a significant downfall of li-
censes is they create a large barrier to entry for new market participants.182 The 
large number of requirements for registration will lead many to stop hosting 
through Airbnb. 
After losing a battle in federal court to the City of San Francisco, Airbnb 
agreed to require all 8,000 of its local hosts to register with the city as part of the 
settlement reached.183 In September 2017, if a host made a new listing, Airbnb 
                                                          
 169. Id. 
 170. Short-Term Residential Rental, supra note 161. 
 171. Id. 
 172. S.F. ADMIN. CODE § 41A.7(a) (2016). 
 173. Short-Term Residential Rental, supra note 161. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. S.F. ADMIN. CODE § 41A.5(g)(3)(C) (2017). 
 178. Id. § 41A.5(g)(4)(B); Short-Term Residential Rental, supra note 161 (If a host only uses Airbnb, 
they do not need to report Transient Occupancy Taxes separately because Airbnb collects the tax 
directly.). 
 179. S.F. ADMIN. CODE § 41A.5(g)(2)(C) (2017). 
 180. See supra Part II(D)(a) (explaining how it is difficult for the government to monitor peer-to-peer 
transactions). 
 181. Carolyn Said, SF warns home-stay companies that hosts must register, S.F. CHRON. (Aug. 1, 
2017), http://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/SF-warns-home-stay-companies-that-hosts-must-
11725790.php. 
 182. See supra Part II(D)(c). 
 183. Airbnb, Inc. v. City & Cty. of S.F., 217 F. Supp. 3d 1066, 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (Airbnb lost 
action seeking injunction against the city’s law requiring hosts to register with the city); Roberto 
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began requiring him or her to complete the registration process mentioned above 
on Airbnb’s own website.184 In November 2017, Airbnb took a giant step towards 
compliance by removing 2,300 listings off its website for not registering with San 
Francisco.185 
The San Francisco city council explicitly said the problem is a lack of afford-
able housing: 
[regulation will be created] to benefit the general public by minimizing 
adverse impacts on the housing supply and on persons and households of 
all income levels resulting from the loss of residential units through their 
conversion to tourist and transient use. This is to be accomplished by 
regulating the conversion of residential units to tourist and transient use . 
. . . It is in the public interest that conversion of residential units be regu-
lated and that remedies be provided when unlawful conversion has oc-
curred, in order to protect the residents and to conserve the limited hous-
ing resources.186 
The San Francisco city council also explained that it has been aware of a 
housing shortage in its city since November, 1980.187 But as explained above, the 
numerous command and control and license regulations do not create more hous-
ing options, nor do they make rent more affordable.188 All these regulations appear 
to do is put a heavy burden on hosts who want to use Airbnb. They fail to address 
the underlying disease that is more than 30 years older than Airbnb. 
Two cities explicitly state their decision to regulate Airbnb is to fix the hous-
ing crises. New York City has made it practically illegal for anyone to use Airbnb, 
and San Francisco has created several hoops to jump through to legally host with 
Airbnb. However, while both are addressing the symptoms of Airbnb’s presence, 
neither are solving the underlying disease. While the disease is multifaceted, the 
blame can be found in poor historical zoning decisions, opportunistic property 
owners, and evaporating rent-capped properties.189 The regulations in New York 
City and San Francisco are not reducing rent prices, nor are they creating more 
housing options. Instead, both are examples of policymaking groups being “cap-
tured” by the hotel industry.190 While affordable housing is a problem, more anti-
Airbnb regulation will not provide a greater net benefit than already exists. 
                                                          
Baldwin, Airbnb agrees to register all hosts in San Francisco, ENGADGET (May 1, 2017), 
https://www.engadget.com/2017/05/01/Airbnb-agrees-to-register-all-hosts-in-san-francisco/. 
 184. San Francisco’s Registration Process: Frequently Asked Questions, AIRBNB, 
https://www.Airbnb.com/help/article/1849/san-francisco-s-registration-process--frequently-asked-
questions (last visited Nov. 12, 2017). 
 185. Todd Johnson, Our view: Airbnb shows how a better San Francisco regulation system is possi-
ble, S.F. BUS. J. (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/news/2017/11/09/our-view-
Airbnb-sharing-economy-regulation-uber.html. 
 186. S.F. ADMIN. CODE § 41A.2-.3 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 187. Id. § 41A.3(g). 
 188. See supra Part II(C)(a). 
 189. See supra Part II(C)(a). 
 190. Benner, supra note 9. 
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IV.  HOW TO MOVE FORWARD: CLOSING THOUGHTS 
Since the emergence of the sharing economy, incumbents have urged policy-
makers to pass new regulations to “level the playing field.” The loudest opponent 
to Airbnb has been the self-interested hotel industry. By illogically linking 
Airbnb, a 10-year old company, to the housing crisis, a century old problem in 
some places, the hotel industry’s multi-million dollar lobbying effort succeeded in 
New York City and San Francisco. Policymakers saddled Airbnb hosts with new 
red-tape which regulated Airbnb up to the same level as national hotel chains.191 
The physician’s theory requires a policymaker to identify the adverse symp-
toms and trace them down to the disease. Policymakers, in their attempt to max-
imize social welfare, should choose the remedy that provides the greatest net ben-
efit. This article does not argue for a regulation-free world for Airbnb. Instead, 
Airbnb should only be regulated if it will lead to a greater net benefit by curing a 
disease more effectively than reputational mechanisms do. 
The reason traditional forms of regulation do not cure these recent symptoms 
is because Airbnb uses big data, operates on the internet, and allows people to 
directly transact. Traditional regulation worked well when it was designed to cure 
informational asymmetry, but informational asymmetry is no longer a serious 
disease because Airbnb’s two-way reputational mechanisms solve it as effectively 
as any government-prescribed regulation. Today, hosts and guests have real incen-
tives to behave honestly and fulfill their end of the bargain. While preserving their 
reputations, both parties have effectively eliminated the problem of informational 
asymmetry. Until new regulation can create a better net benefit, it should not be 
enacted. 
Mis-regulation occurs when policymakers are captured.192 Innovation and 
growth should not be punished because the incumbent is threatened.193 If the point 
is for there to be a level playing field, policymakers should deregulate down, not 
regulate up.194 What would have happened in the late 1800’s if the horse and bug-
gy industry “leveled the playing field” to restrict automobiles? 
This article’s limited scope is unable to address all areas of the sharing econ-
omy. Some future areas of analysis include, whether Airbnb should be taxed and 
treated like a hotel?; what specific regulations should be placed on the sharing 
economy?; and how can the physician’s approach to regulation fix the housing 
crisis in cities like New York City and San Francisco? In addition, future empiri-
cal data should be collected to measure how effective anti-Airbnb regulations are 
at fixing the housing crisis. The data should track the impact regulations have on 
cities, and societies. Some of these regulations were less than one year old at the 
                                                          
 191. Thierer, Koopman, Hobson & Kuiper, supra note 3, at 4 (“Importantly, reputational incentives 
and reputational feedback mechanisms have also increasingly helped market actors overcome infor-
mation symmetries.”). 
 192. LAMBERT, supra note 6, at 33 (explaining how captured policymakers can create regulation that 
restricts rivals, limits “potential entrants into the market,” and injures consumers, but since none of 
those groups are centrally organized, no counter-lobbying occurs). 
 193. Thierer, Koopman, Hobson & Kuiper, supra note 3, at 45. 
 194. Id. (Arguing that by deregulating down, the incumbents should have old rules relaxed across the 
entire industry. A wave of deregulation will not lead to chaos because civil and criminal remedies are 
already in place to check bad behavior.) (Author’s note: Incumbents have spent decades building 
reputations. It is in every hotel’s best interest to live up to the expectations they have built, if not cus-
tomers will go to their competitors.). 
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time this article was written, and as a result, research does not exist to support 
some of its conclusions. 
Finally, a closing thought: let Airbnb and hotel companies continue to com-
pete as they have been for the past decade. Airbnb has shown that it will not be 
regulated out of business despite the hotel industry’s best efforts. The hotel giant 
Marriott realizes this, and is adapting.195 Marriott has begun creating new apps 
and services that will make Marriott’s guest experience rival Airbnb’s.196 The list 
of improvements, which will be integrated over the next several years, include 
introducing concierge robots that deliver fresh towels, creating an app that sug-
gests popular places to eat in the area, and offering a search engine that generates 
a unique list of activities for guests based on their past interests.197 No government 
regulation forced Marriott to develop these new services, Airbnb did. 
 
                                                          
 195. Melia Robinson, The world’s biggest hotel chain is making big changes to defy the threat of 
Airbnb, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 27, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/marriott-wants-to-be-the-next-
Airbnb-2017-9. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
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